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Abstract 
This paper examines the incidence of public health subsidies in Ghana using the Ghana 
Living Standards Survey. Using a combination of (uniform) benefit incidence analysis and a 
discrete choice model, our results give a clear evidence of progressivity with consistent ordering: 
postnatal and prenatal services are the most progressive, followed by clinic visits, and then 
hospital visits. Children health care services are more progressive than adults'. Own price and 
income elasticities are higher for public health care than private health care and for adults than 
children. Poorer households are substantially more price responsive than wealthy ones, implying 
that fee increases for public health care will impact negatively on equity in health care. 
Simulations based on an estimated nested logit model show the importance of opportunity costs 
in healthcare decisions and suggest that reforms that focus only on out-pocket expenses will have 
a limited ability to extend public healthcare to all potential users.. 
 
Keywords: Ghana, public health spending, progressivity, demand for health care, nested 
multinomial logit, poverty. 
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1 Introduction 
Human capital is increasingly recognized as a potentially effective approach to poverty 
reduction through its effect on economic growth and redistribution to the poor. Central to this is 
health—improving access to quality health care and nutrition services, ensuring sustainable 
health financing, and ensuring efficiency in services delivery—requiring massive public 
investments in the health sector (GOG 2005). Recently, Ghana’s public health expenditures have 
increased dramatically under the poverty reduction program, reaching about 6.0 percent and 22.7 
percent of total government expenditures and discretionary expenditures respectively in 2005 
(Osei et al, 2007). During this period, some strong gains were also made in the country’s 
economic improvements as reflected in GDP and per capita income growth rates, stable currency, 
declining inflationary pressures and poverty rates. For instance, poverty levels have fallen 
                                                 
 Corresponding author 
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 11-14
2 
 
consistently from 51.7 percent in 1991 to 28.5 percent in 2005, with extreme poverty even falling 
more (18.5 percent to 9.6 percent).  
These expenditures, if well targeted, should impact on the living standards of poorer 
households. However, the pace of health development in the country has rather stagnated during 
this period, as reflected in the under-five and infant mortality rates, life expectancy, and the 
Human Development Index (HDI). For example, both under-five and infant mortality rates have 
not seen any significant changes between 1993 and 2003 while life expectancy declined from 
57.42 years in 2000 to 56 years in 2005. The country’s HDI also fluctuated, dropping from 0.563 
in 2001 to 0.520 in 2005 (see MOH, 2007) before recently rising to 0.54 in 2010. Meanwhile, 
investments in the sector tended to be concentrated on the supply side such as the provision of 
new facilities and expansion of the existing ones, often neglecting the demand side factors such 
as utilization (Demery et al., 1995). Recent estimates indicate that about 40 percent of Ghanaians 
do not seek medical attention during illness. One issue is therefore whether these expenditures 
are well targeted? How have they affected access to, and the utilization of health care services? 
Who then are the actual beneficiaries of those spending increases and what factors determine the 
public’s utilization of health care services.  
We have three main goals in this paper. First, the published evidence on the progressivity 
of health care services in Ghana (e.g. Canagarajah and Ye (2001)) is getting dated and there is 
value in updating it to reflect the rapid changes in the country, using the most recently available 
living standards survey, the GLSS5 and employing methods used in comparable studies for other 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Glick and Razakamanantsoa (2005)). Secondly, we seek to 
build a model of household healthcare choice that is sufficiently flexible for use in some 
reasonable policy simulations. To that end we use the household level data from the GLSS to 
build a nested multinomial logit (NML) model in which households choose between public, 
private and no health care to estimate demand for health care services. We also apply the 
methods of Morey and Rossmann (2007) to value health services to households using the 
compensating variation. Our final goal is to consider the demand and distributional impacts of 
some options for future policy reform. We use the estimated demand model to simulate the 
impact of free public services, reductions in income poverty and improvements in geographical 
access to treatment options. In doing so we see the central role of opportunity costs rather than 
out-of-pocket expenses on healthcare choices. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: 
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 11-14
3 
 
Section 2 provides a brief overview of the health sector in Ghana. The review of previous 
research is considered in section 3 while section 4 introduces the data sources. Sections 5 and 
explain the research methodology and discuses the results. Section 7 presents the concluding 
remarks and policy implications. 
 
2 A Brief  Overview of the Health System 
Ranking as one of the most developed in the sub-region (Canagarajah and Ye, 2001), 
Ghana’s health sector boasts two teaching hospitals and a sizeable number of regional/district 
hospitals, clinics, as well as community health centres and posts. It comprises three main types of 
health care providers—the public sector, private religious and private non-religious. By 2007, 
there were 1557 public health facilities, 1225 private non-religious health facilities, and 229 
private religious health institutions (MOH 2008). These formal institutions are complemented by 
traditional and spiritual healers that provide care for some 4.0 percent of the population that 
sought health care in 2005.  
The economic crisis of the early 1980s severely affected budgetary resources to the sector 
and caused serious deteriorations in health infrastructure and the entire health delivery system, 
thereby undermining the primary health care strategy adopted in the late 1970s as a vehicle for 
achieving ‘Health for All’ by the year 2000 (Demery et al., 1995; Canagarajah and Ye, 2001). 
The health sector reform of 1985 was therefore aimed at reversing the declining standards and 
decentralizing health administration to local levels. The user charges introduced as a cost 
recovery measure under 1985 health reform did not make any significant impact on revenue but 
rather alienated people from the public health care system (see Asenso-Okyere, 1995). Known as 
the “cash and carry”, it was a system of cost recovery whereby users of public health facilities 
have to contribute towards consultation costs, and pay the full cost of drugs, except for 
vaccinations and the treatment for certain diseases—introduced under the 1985 health sector 
reform program. Note that these user charges were not new in the health sector reforms of 1985. 
They were first introduced in 1971 under the Hospital Fee Act. What was new under the 1985 
reform was the substantial increases in these fees—meant to cover at least 15.0 percent of the 
Ministry of Health recurrent expenditure (Demery et al., 1995). More recently, government 
spending on the health sector has expanded both in real terms and as a share of GDP (Demery et 
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al., 1995). As a share of total expenditures, public health grew by more than 3 percentage points 
between 2000 and 2005, from 2.9 percent to 6.0 percent over this period.  
Unlike, say, education the private sector is the dominant player, providing treatment for 
more than half (55.5 percent) of the population seeking health care in 2005. In 2004, the private 
sector’s health expenditure as a share of the GDP was 3.9 percent as compared with 2.8 percent 
for the public sector (HDR 2007/08). The central government (GOG) remains the main financier 
of public health care, providing over 70 percent of the Ministry of Health Budget. Donor funding, 
though significant, has been declining in recent years—it fell from 28 percent in 1992 to 14.3 
percent in 2008 (Abekah-Nkrumah et al., 2009). This drastic decline on donor supports to the 
health sector is due to the HIPC initiative which allows savings made under the program to be 
channelled into the social sector such as health while direct donor supports declines.  
The search for a more sustainable health financing scheme therefore lingered on until 
2003 when the health insurance bill was enacted, introducing the district mutual health insurance, 
private health insurance, and private mutual health insurance schemes. The National Health 
Insurance Scheme (NHIS) became fully operational in 2005 and accounted for 31.6 percent and 
32.6 percent of the health sector total resources in 2006 and 2008 respectively (Abekah-Nkrumah 
et al., 2009). It is funded from 2.5 percent of value added tax revenue. In addition, formal sector 
employees are supposed to pay their annual premium from their social security contribution 
while other members of the public pay a token of GH¢7.5 per year. 
 
 
3 Public Spending, Health Outcome, and Poverty 
Research on the impact of public spending on health outcome suggests mixed results. 
Bidan and Ravallion (1997), in a cross country study of 35 developing countries find that public 
health spending impacts positively on health outcomes such as life expectancy and infant 
mortality rates. Filmer and Pritchett (1999) also show that doubling spending from 3 to 6% of 
GDP would improve child mortality by only 9 to 13%. Gupta et al. (2001) find for a cross-
section of developing and transition economies that the poor have significantly worse health 
status; and that although the poor are more strongly affected by public spending than the non-
poor, merely increasing public spending will not guarantee improved health status. The general 
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consensus is that increasing public spending alone is insufficient for achieving improved health 
status of the poor.  
Since the path-breaking work by Aaron and McGuire (1970) and twin World Bank 
studies—Meerman (1979) in Malaysia and Selowasky (1979) in Columbia—the (standard) 
benefit incidence (BIA) method has become an established approach for assessing the 
distribution of public expenditures for the poor in developing countries. Castro-Leal et al. (2000) 
have reviewed a sample of studies based on BIA of public health expenditures in Africa and find 
that, the poorest quintile gained only 12% of public health spending in Ghana (1992), 11% in 
Cote d’Ivoire (1995), 4.0% in Guinea (1994), 14% in Kenya (1992), 12% in Madagascar (1993), 
17% in Tanzania (1992/93), and 16% in South Africa (1994). The poor is found to generally 
benefit more from basic care such as preventable health and public health services, while 
benefits from curative health accrue disproportionately more to the well-off.  
Recent empirical evidence on household choices between health care providers in 
developing countries includes Gertler, et al. (1987), Dor and Van der Gaag (1992), Mwabu et al. 
(1993), Ellis et al. (1994), Akin et al. (1995), Glick, et al. (2000), Lindelow (2002), Sahn, et al. 
(2003), Kasirye, et al. (2004), Kamgnia (2008), and Amaghionyeodiwe (2008). Akin et al. 
(1995) estimated demand for health care in Nigeria and find that the price of health care is a 
significant determinant of the choice of health care provider, even after controlling for quality. 
However, previous studies have found that the magnitude of the price effect is very small. 
Specifically, they found that the low price elasticity is more pronounced among the public health 
care providers than the private providers. For example, Mwabu et al. (1993) find in Kenya that a 
10% increase in the price of public health services reduces demand by only 1.0 percentage point 
while a 10% increase in the price of private health services would reduce demand in private 
hospitals by 15.7 percentage points and 19.4 percentage point in private clinics. This suggests 
that increased user fees could generate additional revenue for the public sector without any 
significant reduction in demand.  
Historically, Asenso-Okyere (1995) has found in Ghana that the user charges introduced 
as a cost-sharing measure in 1985 resulted in an average of less than 10% cost recovery and a 
drastic drop in attendance at health facilities, especially in rural areas. A similar finding reported 
in Asenso-Okyere et al. (1998) shows that cost recovery measures in Ghana led to a switch 
towards self-medication and other behaviours aimed at cost saving. Sahn et al. (2003) estimated 
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demand for health care in rural Tanzania and find that a rise in the price of public health care 
leads to a substantial substitution into private health services. Doubling the price of public clinics 
or public hospitals resulted in a decline in the probability of their use by 0.10 while doubling the 
price of private clinics was accompanied by a large increase in the use of public clinics. In Ghana, 
Lavy and Quigley (1993) found that the price elasticity for inpatient visits was -1.82, while only 
-0.25 for outpatients. Van Den Boom et al. (2008) find that proximity to a health facility and the 
cost of treatment have a significant impact on health-care utilization in Ghana. Kamgnia (2008) 
finds that user fees and increased quality has led to an increase in the utilization of health 
facilities in Cameroon. Amaghionyeodiwe (2008) finds in Nigeria that distance and price 
significantly discourage individuals from seeking modern health care services. 
Younger (1999) uses a combination of benefit incidence and the WTP methods to assess 
the relative progressivity of social services in Ecuador and finds that children’ health 
consultations, are more progressive than adult health consultations. In a related study in Peru, 
Younger (2000) finds that, almost all of the health care services are progressive but not per 
capita progressive. In particular, he finds that non-hospital consultations (health centres and 
posts) are more progressive than hospitals consultations, irrespective of whether they are free or 
not. Glick and Razakamanantsoa (2005) find in Madagascar find that most public health services 
are progressive. Specifically, basic health care consultations, outpatients’ hospital care, prenatal 
care, and vaccination are all more equally distributed than consumption expenditures. Outpatient 
hospital care however is per capita regressive. In a more recent paper, Kamgnia (2008) finds in 
Cameroon that public health services are generally progressive but are less so in rural areas.  
 
4 Data 
The database for this study is the GLSS5 survey a nationally representative survey of 
households carried out in 2005. The survey collects information on the health status of 
respondents; that is, whether they have fallen ill or been injured during two weeks prior to the 
survey and if they have sought medical attention, the place of consultation, healthcare 
expenditure and the type of facility (public or private). Other important information such as the 
respondent’s age, gender, education, household income and expenditures are also covered. As 
the demand for healthcare is a negligible amount amongst the healthy in the GLSS dataset, we 
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include only those who have reported an illness/injury or both. We also exclude those whose 
health cost is borne by others such as employer or other relatives.  
A potential issue with the dataset is the timing of its collection. As we noted above, in 2005, 
Ghana was at the start of a slow but significant switch to a National Insurance scheme. Using 
data from the 2008, Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), Agar Brugiavini and Noemi Pace, 
(2010), estimate that as of 2008, thirty-nine percent of women and 29.7 percent of men were 
covered by the NHIS, while Jehu-Appiah et al, 2011, quote official enrolment figures of 55% of 
the population for 2009. Enrolment in the scheme seems to have plateaued and is skewed 
towards those in formal occupations and those with higher incomes or better education (Jehu-
Appiah et al, 2011). Access to facilities registered under the National Insurance legislation is one 
major factor that limits enrolment and helps explain the heterogeneous pattern of enrolment by 
geographical region. The DHS represents an alternative data source on health care facility use 
that is nationally representative, more recent and covers some of the period after the reforms. 
However, the usefulness of the DHS is fundamentally hampered by the lack of information on 
income and other economic variables. As a result it cannot be used for standard estimates of 
benefit incidence and it is also an imperfect basis for a model of healthcare demand. Meanwhile 
the dataset used by Jehu-Appiah et al, 2011, covers only two regions. Though the GLSS5 data 
was gathered before the introduction of the NHIS it is suited to benefit incidence and contains 
detailed economic information on expenditures and opportunity costs of the sort that is valuable 
in modelling the structure of household choices.  
 
5 Estimation 
5.1 Benefit incidence and welfare dominance 
In practice, a benefit incidence analysis involves three steps:(i) valuing public services 
(estimating the unit cost or unit subsidies implied by the provision of public services), (ii) 
imputing the unit subsidy to households or individuals who use the service, and (iii) aggregating 
individuals or households into subgroups of the population to compare the distribution of the 
subsidy among different groups. The groupings are done according to some welfare measure 
such as household expenditure per capita or adult’s equivalent. We use the commonly-employed 
binary indicator approach, which assigns the value of unity of if a particular service is used, zero 
otherwise (Younger 1999, Glick and Razakamanantsoa 2005). 
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The formal approach to analyzing benefit incidence (the so-called ‘welfare dominance’ 
testing) is provided by Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991). They prove that for any social welfare 
function that favours an equitable distribution of income, marginally increasing subsidies on 
good x while reducing those on good y by just enough to keep total income unchanged will 
improve social welfare when x’s concentration curve is everywhere above y’s. The concentration 
curve is a normative tool similar to the Lorenz curve, and plots the cumulative shares of 
individuals in the population, ranked by household expenditure per capita/per equivalent adults 
on the x-axis and the cumulative shares of benefits on the y-axis. However, unlike the Lorenz 
curve, which represents the cumulative percentage of total income held by a cumulative 
proportion of the population (after ordering income in increasing magnitude), a concentration 
curve can lie above the diagonal—the poorest 40% of the population cannot earn more than 40% 
of total income, but they can receive more than 40% of total benefits from public spending 
(Hakro and Akram (2007)). 
Two measures of progressivity can be defined (Younger et al., 1999; Glick and 
Razakamanantsoa, 2005). ‘Expenditure progressivity’, or simply progressivity, involves 
comparing the distribution of the benefit to the distribution of welfare (expenditures). If the 
benefit concentration curve dominates the expenditure Lorenz curve—that is, if it is at all points 
above the curve for household expenditures—then the benefit is said to be progressive. Such a 
benefit would more likely redistribute the resources even if funded by proportional taxes, and 
the poorer are comparatively better off when considering both their income and public 
spending, compared to considering only their income (Hakro and Akram (2007)). 
The second measure is called ‘per capita progressivity’ following Sahn and Younger (2000). 
This compares the distribution of the benefit to the distribution of the population rather than 
expenditures. A benefit is said to be per capita progressive (pro-poor) if the benefit curve lies 
everywhere above (dominates) the 45 degree line. Benefits whose concentration curves lie 
everywhere above the diagonal show that poorer households receive disproportionately large 
shares of the benefit. This measure is stricter but insures that, for any definition of the poverty 
line, the poor receive a disproportionate share of the benefit. Concentration curves that lie below 
the Lorenz curve are classified as regressive—the benefit accrues disproportionately to the 
wealthy. It is also possible to rank different services according to their progressivity. For 
example, a given subsidy is said to dominate another if its concentration curve is everywhere 
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above the concentration curve for the other. The concentration coefficient, which is calculated in 
the same fashion as the GINI coefficient, estimates the inequalities in the distribution of 
government expenditures. The difference however, is that the concentration coefficient is 
calculated by keeping the income group the same (Hakro and Akram (2007)). The concentration 
coefficient can lie in range of -1 and 1 while the GINI coefficient lies between 0 and 1. If the 
concentration coefficient is lower than the GINI coefficient, it shows that expenditures are more 
evenly distributed than income and vice versa.  
 
Decision to seek care and health seeking behaviour  
Reporting illness and seeking care vary with income, education, age and area of residence, 
with the poorest quintile showing lower rates of reporting illness (14.0 percent) compared with 
the richest quintile (25.7 percent). Of those reporting illness, about 60 percent sought health 
care—about 53 percent for the poorest quintile compared with about 63 percent for the richest 
quintile; about 68 percent for urban residents compared with 55.5 percent for rural residents 
(Table 1). The lower rate reported for rural areas contrasts sharply with the slightly higher rate 
for reporting illness for rural (20.4 percent) compared with urban (19.1 percent) areas. The low 
rate of reporting illness among the poor should not be interpreted as lower prevalence of sickness 
among this group. Rather, it could mean there is high health consciousness among the rich, 
which of course increases with improvements in living standards and education. Besides, the 
poor are likely to accept illness as a normal feature of life which they do not consider worth 
reporting. Reporting of illness is highest among infants (30.75 percent) and elderly (30.69 
percent) as compared with other age categories. These groups are more susceptible to illness due 
to weak immune system. Public hospitals account for about a quarter (25.77 percent) of all 
categories. Its utilization however increases both with income and education (Table 1). Urban 
residents received about 34 percent of health care from public hospitals compared with 20.5 
percent for rural dwellers.  
Usage of public clinics is generally common among the poorest and rural households and 
the uneducated, ranging between 19.76 percent and 11.20 percent for rural and urban residents 
respectively. Though utilization of private facilities is higher for the richest quintile compared to 
the poorest quintile, private facilities form just about 12 percent of all categories for the richest 
quintile, thus, confirming the finding that in Ghana the rich utilized more of public facilities 
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(Demey et al. (1995)). Traditional healers and spiritualists both accounted for just 4.36 percent of 
all categories, showing a low patronage of informal health care among Ghanaians who seek 
medical care. The utilization of traditional healers actually decreases with income and education 
and are also more prevalent in rural areas. The use of drug store is very common among 
Ghanaians, accounting for over 32.0 percent of all categories. Its utilization however, decreases 
with income and education and is also more common among males than females. Pharmacies 
form just about 7.43 percent of drugs stores and 2.4 percent of all categories (Table 1).  
 
Progressivity of public health care services 
Progressivity analysis enables us to examine the extent to which public health spending 
effectively reached the poor. We could also identify which public health services redistribute 
public subsidies disproportionately towards the poor. We measure progressivity for curative 
health care (hospital and clinic visits), postnatal care, and prenatal care. It is important to bear in 
mind that progressivity refers only to public health services. Figure 1 presents the concentration 
curves for publicly provided health services. These curves are supported by the statistical 
dominance test (Table 2) and the GINI and concentration indexes (Table 3).1 
We first compared these services to the benchmark Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line. 
A casual inspection of the concentration curves shows that both public hospital and public clinic 
visits are progressive—they are less concentrated than the Lorenz curve of household 
expenditure—but are per capita regressive. Public clinics are nearly pro-poor—it appears it 
crosses the 45-degrees line at the 20th percentile indicating dominance over the 45-degree line. 
Postnatal and prenatal services are per capita progressive, indicating a clear case of pro-poor 
targeting for these services. The fact that basic care (clinic care in this case) is more progressive 
than hospital care reflects the urban location of hospitals (Glick and Razakamanantsoa, 2005).  
These results are not dissimilar to those in previous waves of the GLSS (Demery et al., 1995; 
Canagarajah and Ye, 2001) and those from other countries (Sahn and Younger, 2000; Castro-
Leal et al., 2000; Glick and Razakamanantsoa, 2005; Kamgnia, 2008). The absolute 
progressivity of prenatal and postnatal services reflects two things: 1) there is high fertility 
among low-income households; and 2) the distribution of public prenatal and postnatal services 
                                                 
1  Households are ranked by household expenditure per equivalent adults. The benefit incidence and the 
concentration curves and indices are estimated using “Distributive Analysis Stata Package (DASP)” by 
AbdelkrimAraar and Jean-Yves Duclos, Université Laval PEP, CIRPÉE and World Bank, 2009.  
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are well-targeted (Figure 1). Immunization services are also pro-poor. Overall, public health 
services are still progressive. even though the use of health services, particularly by the poor 
dropped drastically after the introduction of the ‘Cash and Carry’ system,  
We can also compare the concentration curve for one health service with another health 
service—relative progressivity test. From Table 5, clinic consultations dominate hospital 
consultations, indicating that clinic care is more progressive than hospital care. There is no 
dominance between prenatal care and postnatal care but they all dominate clinic and hospital 
services. Thus, by this classification of health services, prenatal care and postnatal care are the 
most progressive, followed by clinic visits, and then hospital visits. Note that most prenatal and 
postnatal services are basically free while curative care attracts high user fees. Besides, there are 
more children in poorer households than in richer household. Consequently, the poor tend to 
participate more in these services thereby making them more progressive. 
 
5.2 Choice of health care providers 
The benefit incidence analysis presented above lacks behavioural foundation, hence cannot 
be used for policy simulation. Demand estimation enables us to understand the behavioural 
responses to public spending. Previous studies on health care demand have used various 
specifications including the multinomial logit (e.g. Van Den Boom et al. (2008) in Ghana), 
multinomial probit (e.g. Akin et al. (1995) in Nigeria), and nested logit (e.g. Mwabu et al. (1993) 
in Kenya, Younger (1999) in Ecuador, Sahn et al. (2003) in Tanzania, Kasirye et al. (2004) in 
Uganda). The multinomial logit model however suffers from the Independent of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA) restriction, which assumes that all alternative subgroups are uncorrelated and 
the cross prices elasticities are constant across subgroups, hence leading to biased estimates. The 
nested logit model relaxes the IIA restriction by allowing for correlation among similar 
alternatives (such as public and private).  
We formulate our model in the spirit of Gertler et al (1987), Sahn et al (2003). We 
assume that the individual or household has a utility function that depends on the quality of the 
health care option selected and on consumption of all other goods. Confronted with the decision 
to seek health care, the individual must first choose either to seek care or not. Consulting a care 
provider improves the individual’s health status but improved health is achieved at the cost of 
medical expenses paid and reduced consumption of other goods. Second, conditional on the 
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decision to receive care, an individual must choose the type of provider to consult (private or 
public). The individual chooses the option that yields the highest utility given all alternatives 
even the choice of no-care. An individual will only choose the no-care option only if it yields 
utility higher than all other alternatives. For each option, the indirect utility associated with 
choosing that option depends on: 
 
ijijijiij eHPYcV  1)(      (1) 
 
where, c(Y-Pj) is net income, which is given as household income (proxied by household 
expenditure, Y) less the cost of health care at option j, (Pj). The function Hij, measures the quality 
of option j and is a function of the characteristics of that choice, as well as individual and 
household characteristics of the demander; and ej is error which can be correlated across options 
within a branch. For the no-care or self-treatment option, Hijis normalized to zero based on the 
assumption that the individual gains no utility from not utilizing health care. Since we cannot 
directly observe the change in health status, we replace Hij by the reduced form equation for the 
utility from improved health status as follows: 
 
ijijjij nXQH   1     (2) 
 
where, Qi is a vector of quality variables and Xi is a vector of observed household and individual 
characteristics. Substituting (2) into (1) yields: 
ijijjijiij XQPYcV   )(    (3) 
 
where, εij=eij+nij. ψj is the coefficient on household and individual characteristics which are 
allowed to remain constant across alternatives. Following previous authors, the function, Hj is 
assumed to be linear while net income )( iji PYc  is assumed to be logarithmic.2 
The specification used in this study is a nested multinomial logit with three options for 
health care considered—no-care or self-treatment, public, or private. In this framework, since the 
                                                 
2 Previous authors have used various specifications: linear (Akin 1985; Dor and van der Gaag 1993); quadratic 
(Gertler and van der Gaag 1990; logarithmic (Younger 1999).  
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decision to choose a particular care provider is a discrete choice problem, the determination of 
demand involves estimating the probability that a particular service provider—public or 
private—will be chosen. In our model, two of the options are in one branch; while the other 
option (with utility normalized to zero) is in the second branch. Thus, the probability that a 
person chooses provider j is given as (4):  
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where Vj is the utility of option j, Vi is the utility of option i, and σ is the dissimilarity parameter 
coefficient, which lies between 0 and 1 for the nested logit to be consistent with additive random 
utility maximization (Cameron and Trivedi 2009).  
The cost of health care (Pj) includes both the direct and the indirect (opportunity) costs. The 
direct cost is the sum of consultation, cost of staying at health facility, cost of drugs, and cost of 
travel. The opportunity cost measures the cost of time required to receive health care, and it is 
estimated as travel time plus waiting time multiplied by the predicted wage estimated from a 
simple OLS wage function (Table A.1). For children, the predicted wage is mother’s predicted 
wage since children do not work and mothers have to forgo their daily wage in order to 
accompany their wards to health facilities. The opportunity cost can be high, hence dominating 
total cost. In our model for instance, the share of opportunity cost in total health cost was 57 
percent in the entire sample, 62 percent in the adults’ sample, and 39 percent in the children 
sample. For the options not chosen, we estimate the monetary costs using the median cost for the 
individual’s region, area of residence (rural/urban), and type of provider (public/private), 
following Younger (1999). For the no-care option, the net income is just the gross income.  
The GLSS5 does not contain quality information; hence the Hij is simply a function of 
household and individual characteristics. By leaving out important quality variables that 
probably correlate with net income and with the probability of choosing a particular care 
provider, it could mean that we are overestimating elasticity estimates which could tend to 
underestimate the incidence of the health services (Younger, 1999). Younger (1999) argues that 
this omitted variable does not affect the estimated progressivity of health care services.  
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We considered three samples, namely, entire sample, adults and children. Each model 
includes similar regressors of age, gender, relationship with head of household, net income, a 
dummy for level of education, a dummy of health insurance, and household size while 
controlling for religion, area of residence, and sector of employment. For the children equation, 
the level of education and sector of employment are those of the head of household. Out of a 
total sample of 7108 individuals, 26.45 percent of them consulted a public provider, 32.87 
percent consulted a private provider, whereas 40.65 percent did not consult a health practitioner.  
Table A.2 gives the definition of these variables while the means and the standard deviation 
are provided in Table 4. Mean household expenditures are reportedly higher for users of public 
facilities (GH¢2,237.47) than users of private facilities (GH¢2,136.79), and lowest for no-care 
(GH¢1,983.46). Mean health expenditures—both individual and household—are significantly 
higher for users of public facilities, followed by private non-religious, and private religious; and 
higher for urban than rural while showing no significant gender difference except for the poorest 
quintile (Table 3). Total cost of care (direct and indirect/ opportunity), including imputed cost for 
options not chosen, averaged GH¢10.42 for the entire sample, GH¢12.93 for the adults sample, 
and GH¢6.11 for the children sample. The opportunity cost, which includes the earnings forgone 
to seek health care, constitutes the lion share of this cost—GH¢5.95 compare with direct cost of 
GH¢4.47 for the entire sample (Table 4).  
The mean travel time to seek care is much higher for users of public facilities, followed 
by private non-religious and private religious institutions. It however, decreases with income for 
both users of public and private non-religious health facilities but increases with income for users 
of private religious facilities. It also masks significant variation between urban and rural areas—
much lower for urban than rural dwellers—thus, showing that richer and urban households have 
a better access to these facilities than poorer and rural households. From Table 4, the entire 
sample has a mean age of 28 years (41 years for adults), 54 percent are female (58 percent for 
adults and 48 percent for children), 33 percent married, 15 percent has some primary education 
and 25 percent attains primary six or some junior high schooling. Household size averaged 5.5 
with 25 percent of households being female headed. The majority of the sample (68 percent) 
resides in rural areas while 78 percent work in the informal sector. Only 16 percent of the sample 
has health insurance (18 percent for adults and 14 percent for children).  
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Econometrics results 
This section presents the estimation results of the nested multinomial logit model based 
on the specification presented above. This involves estimating the individual’s probability of 
choosing three health care options: no-care, public care or private care, with no-care being the 
base category. The nested multinomial logit model allows us to relax the homoscedasticity (IIA) 
assumption of a potential conditional logit model. The tree structure is as if, the individual first 
chooses to consult a health care provider or not and then chooses the type of provider (public or 
private). Thus our result is conditional on having been sick. The results are presented in Table 5.  
For each equation, the Wald tests reject the null of all coefficients being zero and the null 
of equality of coefficients across the public and private options. The nested logit reduces to the 
conditional logit if the two dissimilarity parameters are both equal to one (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2009). Due to the nature of our nested structure, we constrain the no-care option to unity; hence 
its dissimilarity parameter is 1. The dissimilarity parameters, σ (0.459 for the entire sample, 
0.474 for the adult sample, and 0.559 for the children sample) are between zero and one, thus 
indicating that our model is consistent with additive random utility maximization. The LR test, τ 
rejects the IIA assumption and gives a strong support for the nested logit instead of a standard 
multinomial logit, with the exception of the children model (Table 5). 3  The fact that the 
dissimilarity parameter is lower for the adults sample than the children and entire sample 
indicates a greater substitutability between public and private care for adults.  
 The coefficient on net income is statistically significant, both across sample and provider, 
relative to no-care or self-treatment option as expected. The significance of net income implies 
that cost of care and income, which enters the model via the net income function are also 
important determinants. As for individual characteristics, no statistically significant gender 
differences are observed at all conventional significance levels. This is consistent with the 
descriptive statistics which indicates no significant difference between male and female health 
seeking behaviour.  
Female headed households however have significantly lower probability of seeking 
health care relative to male headed households, except for the children sample. Age has a 
negative and significant effect on the probability of seeking care, relative to children under 5 
                                                 
3  The children model fails to reject the IIA assumption, thus indicating that a standard multinomial logit is 
acceptable for the children data. 
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years, both across options and across samples. In the adult model, elderly people have a lower 
probability to seek care compare with 15 – 21 year group. Thus, the probability of seeking care 
decreases with age, conditional on being ill. 
The level of education positively affects the probability of seeking health care, though 
there is no significant difference between having some primary education and no education. The 
size of the household generally decreases the probability of seeking health care, which is 
stronger for private than public care. Household size is not significant in the children model. 
Enrolling in health insurance program significantly increases the probability of seeking health 
care, both across options and across samples, except in the children model where though positive, 
it is insignificant. The probability of seeking health care is also positively correlated with the 
number of days ill. We also control for regional and religious differences as well as the 
relationship with head of household. The default for the regional and religious dummies is rural 
Savannah and all other religions respectively. Only urban residents (except Accra metropolis) 
have higher probability of seeking health care. With regards to the religious dummy, both 
Moslems and Catholic have higher chances of seeking health care while traditional religion 
decreases the probability of seeking health care (Table 5).  
 
Valuation based on the compensating variation 
The standard benefit incidence (unit-cost) approach is often criticised for its arbitrary 
valuation of public services.  The alternative is to use measures benefits estimated from the 
school choice model. Compensating variation (CV) is that amount of money that when 
subtracted from the individual’s income in the new state (1) makes utility in the new state, with 
the subtraction, equal to utility in the original state (0). That is,  
jijjjijijjji XQCVPYcXQPYcV   )()( 01 (5) 
where, P0 is price in the original state, P1 is price in the new state etc.  In the method developed 
by Morey and Rossman (2007), it is supposed that the household-specific epsilon terms are the 
same in both states and therefore cancel by assumption. We use the NMNL estimates presented 
above to calculate CV for public healthcare, which we then used to assess the benefits of public 
healthcare to households.  
For a household where public healthcare is the best option and private healthcare 
provides the second highest level of utility, CV is defined implicitly by the following equation,   
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where Vpublic and Vprivate are the estimated utilities associated with public and private options 
respectively, α is the coefficient of net income.  In the case where the second best option for a 
household is no treatment then we replace Vprivate by 0. Where the best option is either no 
treatment or private treatment, then CV = 0. By this approach, we are able to rank the services by 
users—adults health and children health. The resulting concentration curves are reported in 
Figure 4, showing both CV-based and uniform methods. The methods yield similar results.  
A casual inspection of the curves indicates that both adults and children health care are 
(expenditure) progressive but not per capita progressive. Note that, this part of the analysis 
focuses mainly on curative health and only those who have reported an illness/injury(meaning 
that children immunization services and adults medical check-ups are excluded). Inclusion of all 
sample would have altered the results, especially children’s immunization would yield per capita 
progressivity of children’s health. Children health however, dominates adult health, implying 
that, public spending on children health would distribute welfare more disproportionately toward 
poorer households than spending on adults’ health. Overall, Ghana’s public health system is 
(expenditure) progressive but per capita regressive, a finding that agrees generally with those 
from other developing countries (see Sahn and Younger, 2000; Castro-Leal et al., 1999; Glick 
and Razakamanantsoa, 2005). 
 
The elasticity of demand 
The coefficients of the NMNL estimates can be difficult to interpret, thus we explore the 
influence of price and income variables by the analysis of elasticities. If we let pjto represent the 
price for provider j, which by assumption only enters utility of option j (Vj), then it follows that  
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Hence, the own elasticity, 
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Note that this equals the standard formula for multinomial logit when sigma is 1. Note also that 
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Hence, the cross-price elasticity is therefore, 
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Since 0<σ<1 we know therefore that the cross elasticity has the opposite sign to the derivative of 
Vj with respect to pj.  
 
Table 6 presents the own price, cross-price, and income elasticities calculated at mean levels for 
each health option by expenditure quintiles. All elasticities have their expected signs, which are 
higher (in absolute terms) for public care than private care, and also higher for poorest quintiles 
than richest quintile, suggesting that: 1) health care demand among the lowest income 
individuals is substantially more price and income elastic than among the richest group, 2) 
demand for public care is more price and income elastic than private care, and 3) income 
(proxied by household expenditure) and price of care are crucial determinants of choice of 
formal health care in Ghana.  
A 10 percent increase in the price of care would decrease demand for public care by 9.0 
percent compared to 4.0 percent for private care (19.2 percent and 8.0 percent decrease in 
poorest quintile demand for public and private care respectively), other factors being constant. 
For the adults’ sample, a 10 percent increase in the price of care decreases demand for the public 
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care by 11.9 percent compared to 5.2 percent for private care. In the children sample, a 10 
percent reduction in price of care would lead a 4.8 percent reduction in demand for public care 
and 1.6 percent for private care (Table 6).  
The cross-price elasticities also have the expected positive signs, which are higher for 
adults sample than children sample. This means that the substitution effects are high for the 
adults compared with the children sample. For instance, the elasticity of demand for public care 
with respect to private care price rise is 0.14 for the adults sample compared to 0.01 for the 
children sample. On the other hand, the elasticity of demand for private care with respect to an 
increase in public care price is 0.025 and 0.003 for adults’ and children samples respectively. 
Increasing the price of the private care by 10 percent for instance increases demand for the public 
care by 1.3 percent (3.0 percent for the poorest quintile and 0.43 percent for the richest quintile) 
while raising the price of the public care by 10 percent increases demand for the private care by 
0.21 percent (0.33 percent for the poorest quintile and 0.12 percent for the richest quintile). 
The generally low cross price elasticities between public and private care means that, a 
rise in the price of either of these options would drive people more into no-care/self-treatment 
than substitution into public and private care. The income elasticities are positive as expected as 
and slightly higher for public care than private care (Table 6). A 10.0 percent rise in income for 
example, would lead to about 2.8 percent rise in the demand for public care compared with 2.1 
percent increase in demand for private care. Both the adults’ and children’s model follows 
similar pattern, though the adults demand for health care is more price and income elastic than 
the children and the entire sample. 
 
6 Policy Simulation  
We explore the meaning of these elasticities further by carrying out a number of policy 
simulations on the entire sample. We consider three ways of altering public health care 
accessibility: 1) making public health care free, 2) increasing the number of public facilities, 
especially in rural areas (simulated by cutting in half the travel cost for accessing healthcare), 
and 3) increasing the income of poorer households. We do not have information to calculate the 
relative cost of these policies so these simulations should be seen as incomplete. The first policy 
change is similar to health insurance where the initial premium is negligible or too small to 
inflict future financial obligations on households redeemable at public facilities only. It is 
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therefore similar to the National Health Insurance Scheme (although that scheme does place 
some limits on the services that are covered). The second policy reflects the high current costs of 
access to healthcare for many people living in (rural) areas of Ghana. The third policy considers 
the indirect impact on healthcare spending of a generalised reduction in poverty. 
Table 7 reports the results of the simulation exercises. From the baseline model (when all 
variables are at their actual values), we observe that about 40.6 percent of the sample will use no-
care (self-treatment), 32.9 percent private care, and 26.5 percent public care. Next, we change the 
price of the public option to zero. We find that, the probability of choosing no consultation and 
using private care declines drastically to 33.4 percent and 28.5 percent respectively, while the 
probability of using public care climbs to 38.1 percent, representing 11.6 percentage points rise. 
Thus there is a significant shift to public facilities, but in line with the DHS data for 2008 
analysed by Brugiavini and Pace, (2010) it is notable that there is still a large fraction of ill 
individuals who do not choose the public health option. In other words, this simulations suggests 
that a NHIS scheme may have a limited take-up even in long-run equilibrium. The reason is 
primarily that for many users opportunity costs of using health care services are large. For this 
reason they opt to use no service or in some cases to choose nearby private alternatives. 
We next consider a policy that raises out of pocket expenses but brings healthcare 
services closer to the populace, albeit in a simplified manner. Still keeping the cost of accessing 
private care unchanged we cut the travel cost to public facilities by half. To offset this, we 
double the price of public care. Note that travel cost includes both direct cost on transportation to 
and from the health facility and travel time. For many individuals travel costs dominate out of 
pocket expenses, thus, even with a rise in the price of public services, the total cost of public care 
falls for many individuals.  
In table 7 we first present the effect of a doubling of the public healthcare price and then 
show the effect of the combined policy of higher out-of-pocket expenses plus lower travel costs. 
When prices are raised we find that the probability of using public care declines by 17.6 
percentage points while that of private care and no-care increases by 2.7 and 14.9 percentage 
points respectively (Table 7). The decline in demand is more drastic for the poorest quintiles 
with some substitution into private care. The vast majority however, substituted into no-care/self-
treatment. However, when travel costs are simultaneously halved, the result shows a rise in the 
use of public care from 26.5 percent to 29.3 percent while no-care drops to 37.8 percent. Private 
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care, remains basically unchanged, dropping only marginally (0.5 percentage point). Thus, this 
combined policy causes the demand for public care to increase with some moving away from 
private care. While the introduction of user of fees in 1985 resulted in an overall decline in health 
care utilization (Asenso-Okyere 1995, Asenso-Okyere et al. 1998), this finding suggests that 
raising price could produce desirable outcome if such price increases are accompanied by 
systematic reductions in travel cost. Efforts at reducing travel cost towards zero—which will 
result in a drastic reduction in the opportunity cost component make public care relatively 
cheaper and more accessible, especially to poorer households.4 
Finally we simulate the effects of poverty alleviation in two ways: 1) by bringing all 
persons below the poverty line to the upper poverty line and 2) moving all persons out of the 
poorest quintile. In both cases, we observe only a marginal change in probabilities of receiving 
care, both public and private, with the probability of using no-care also declining marginally by 
0.01 percentage point (Table 7). In other words, the results suggest that to raise access to 
healthcare services, generalised anti-poverty policies will have only weak effects.  
 
 
7 Conclusion  
We have examined the determinants of the choice of health care as well as the extent to 
which public health expenditures are reaching the poor in Ghana. Ghana’s health system, 
particularly public health is generally progressive in that benefits accrue disproportionately 
towards the poor (in terms of the expenditure Lorenz). In relative terms, postnatal and prenatal 
care are the most progressive, followed by clinics, and then hospitals; an ordering that has 
become standard for developing countries. Both children and adults health are progressive 
relative to household expenditures but not in absolute terms. Children healthcare is more 
progressive than adults’ health. This all suggests that the income distribution would become 
more equal if the government gave all households an annual income transfer rather than 
subsidized health care, other things being constant. We can also say that, an additional cedi spent 
on clinics would more likely improve equity than an additional cedi spent on hospitals, if both 
are spent in the same way as the current budget so that neither the beneficiaries nor their share of 
                                                 
4 Implementing this policy however, could be costly since it may require building of more health facilities and 
training of additional health personnel. 
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the benefits change. In the same vein, spending on children health is more likely to improve 
overall equity than those on adults’ health. However, while raising the income of the poor to at 
least the poverty line or moving all individuals from the poorest quintile increases the probability 
of seeking health care, the effect of income transfers on healthcare use is very small. 
A large proportion of the sampled individuals (40 percent) either do not seek medical 
help at all or do not consult a health professional. Reporting of illness is also lower among the 
poor and the uneducated, suggesting that raising the health consciousness of the people through 
education would raise their utilization of health care services. The elasticities of demand show a 
high price and income elasticities for the lower income households and for public care. Thus, 
both prices and income are crucial determinants of health care choice. Raising the price of public 
care would result in a substantial reduction in demand for public care while increasing the choice 
of no-care/self-treatment and private care, thus causing a substitution into private care in the 
richest quintile.  However, doubling the price of public care would not cause substantial 
decreases in demand if this is implemented simultaneously with at least 50 percent reduction in 
travel cost. This policy is costly as it requires building of new facilities and training of more 
health professionals.  
Above all the demand model reveals the importance of opportunity costs in seeking 
healthcare for adults and children. As long as these costs remain high, enrolment in healthcare 
insurance is likely to be incomplete for low income families and those households that lack ready 
access to healthcare facilities.  
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Table 1  
Decision to seek care and health seeking behaviour 
Sub groups 
 
Type of health facility visited by those who consulted 
 % seeking 
care 
Public 
hospital
Public 
clinic 
Private 
hospital
Private 
clinic 
Drugs 
store Other 
Quintile        
      Bottom 20% 52.64 17.91 24.26 2.12 6.13 33.57 16.01
      Top 20% 65.33 32.02 11.16 11.61 11.8 27.72 5.69
Gender        
      Male 59.91 24.56 16.24 5.36 9.27 35.14 9.43
      Female 59.57 26.79 16.20 7.05 9.79 30.21 9.96
Age Category        
      Children<18 59.64 24.67 20.09 4.98 9.56 32.52 8.19
      Adults 59.78 26.51 13.60 7.15 9.54 32.46 10.74
Location        
      Urban  68.00 34.13 11.20 10.30 9.46 30.66 4.25
      Rural 55.46 20.53 19.36 3.75 9.61 33.62 13.13
Education        
      None 58.10 23.01 18.14 5.75 8.19 37.39 7.52
      Primary 56.66 22.76 13.86 5.10 9.02 39.61 9.65
      JSS/Middle 62.86 30.75 13.12 8.60 9.34 30.85 7.34
      Secondary 64.34 33.71 10.11 11.61 13.11 26.22 5.24
Postsecondary 72.15 33.33 11.04 14.04 16.67 21.05 3.51
Poverty        
      Poor 58.98 24.99 16.98 5.28 9.34 33.37 10.04
      Non-poor 66.96 32.38 9.69 14.76 11.45 24.49 7.23
All Ghana 59.72 25.77 16.22 6.27 9.55 32.48 9.71
Note: Drug store includes pharmacy and chemical stores. Others include MCH clinic,consultants’  
home, patients home, others. Source: Own estimation based on GLSS 5 data. 
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Table 2 
Dominance Table for Public Health Services 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1). Prenatal  non-D D D D D D 
2). Postnatal   D D D D D 
3). 45-degree    non-D D D D 
4). Clinic visits     D D D 
5). All public health      D D 
6). Hospital visits       D 
7). Expenditure               
Note: D indicates that concentration curve of row dominates that of column. Non-D indicates that non-
dominance between the concentration curves cannot that be rejected. Dominance is rejected if 
there is at least one significant difference in one direction and no significant difference in the other, with 
comparisons at 19 quantiles and 5percent significance level. Source: Author’s own estimations. 
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Table 3 
GINI coefficient and concentration indexes for use of public health services 
Variable Estimate Standard error Lower bound Upper bound
Ginicoefficient 0.4294 0.0023 0.4250 0.4339 
Concentration indexes:     
           Prenatal -0.1628 0.0074 -0.1773 -0.1483 
           Postnatal -0.0212 0.0276 -0.0754 0.0328 
Immunization -0.1265 0.0100 -0.1462 -0.1068 
           Clinic -0.0282 0.0036 -0.0353 -0.0211 
           Hospital 0.1524 0.0075 0.1394 -0.1690 
           Public health 0.0175 0.0060 0.0057 0.02926 
 Source: Own estimation based on GLSS 5 survey. 
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Table 4 
 Descriptive statistics of regressors 
  Entire Sample  Adults  Children 
Variable Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Gender (female=1) 0.54 0.50 0.58 0.49 0.48  0.50 
Age 28.12 22.65 41.40 18.06 5.41  3.93 
Age in complete years       
0 - 4 0.18 0.39   0.50  0.50 
5 - 14 0.19 0.39   0.50  0.50 
15 - 21 0.09 0.28 0.14 0.34   
22 - 49 0.35 0.48 0.55 0.50   
50 plus 0.20 0.40 0.31 0.46   
Married 0.33 0.47 0.52 0.50   
Relationship with head       
 Child of head 0.39 0.49 0.14 0.35 0.83  0.38 
Other child 0.06 0.23 0.01 0.12 0.13  0.33 
Spouse of head 0.17 0.38 0.27 0.44 0.00  0.02 
Education in levels       
None 0.53 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.39 0.49 
 Some primary 0.15 0.36 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.33 
Primary or JHS 0.25 0.43 0.37 0.48 0.38 0.49 
 Some secondary 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.11 
   Secondary 0.04 0.20 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23 
Postsecondary 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18 
Female headed 0.25 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.23  0.42 
Household size 5.47 3.33 4.97 3.33 6.34  3.16 
Catholic 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.14  0.35 
Moslem 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39 0.23  0.42 
Traditional religion 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.06  0.24 
Area of residence       
   Accra (GAMA) 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26 0.05  0.21 
Other Urban 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.25  0.43 
Rural forest 0.29 0.46 0.29 0.45 0.31  0.46 
Rural coast 0.10 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.08  0.28 
Rural Savannah 0.28 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.31  0.46 
Insurance 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.38 0.14  0.35 
No of days ill 6.14 4.11 6.67 4.35 5.25  3.51 
Formal sector 0.10 0.31 0.11 0.32 0.09  0.29 
Informal sector 0.78 0.41 0.76 0.43 0.82  0.38 
Notes: 1Figures include imputed values for options not chosen. 
Source: Own estimation based on GLSS 5 data 
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Table 5 
Nested Multinomial Logit Model for Choice of Health Care, baseline 
 Entire sample Adults  Children 
VARIABLES Private Public Private Public  Private Public 
Constant -3.366*** -3.387*** -3.589*** -3.620***  -2.717 -2.738 
 (0.712) (0.713) (0.704) (0.706)  (2.045) (2.513) 
Gender (female=1) -0.012 -0.009 -0.010 -0.008  0.023 0.022 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061)  (0.089) (0.085) 
Age in complete years        
   5 – 14 -0.552*** -0.576***    -0.495 -0.522 
 (0.089) (0.089)    (0.351) (0.409) 
   15 – 21 -0.729*** -0.761***      
 (0.122) (0.123)      
   22 – 49 -0.329** -0.375*** 0.112 0.085    
 (0.131) (0.131) (0.079) (0.079)    
   50 plus -0.690*** -0.740*** -0.318*** -0.350***    
 (0.137) (0.138) (0.085) (0.086)    
Education in levels        
   Primary graduate 0.036 0.039 0.029 0.028  0.082 0.084
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023)  (0.053) (0.057)
   Secondary grad. 0.028* 0.029*  0.045* 0.046*  0.004 0.006 
 (0.016)  (0.017) (0.024) (0.026)  (0.089) (0.090) 
   Post-secondary 0.026 0.027 0.004 0.004   0.136**  0.136** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)  (0.065) (0.065) 
Female headed household -0.133* -0.116 -0.214*** -0.198***  -0.098 -0.081 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.069) (0.069)  (0.243) (0.273) 
Household size -0.016* -0.015 -0.020** -0.019**  -0.020 -0.020 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.017) (0.017) 
Traditional religion -0.184* -0.190* -0.207* -0.214**  -0.210 -0.212 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107)  (0.195) (0.195) 
Urban residence 0.477*** 0.464*** 0.502*** 0.489***  0.525** 0.511** 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.083) (0.083)  (0.222) (0.249) 
Health Insurance 0.262*** 0.286*** 0.266*** 0.290***  0.166 0.185 
 (0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)  (0.281) (0.291)
Number of days ill 0.055*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.059***  0.101** 0.105**
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.048) (0.048) 
Log(Net expenditure) 0.217** 0.217** 0.210** 0.210**  0.194* 0.194*
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.100) (0.100)  (0.104 (0.104 
σ 0.4628** 0. 4628** 0.4586** 0. 4586**  0.5591 0.5591 
 (0.2314) (0.2314) (0.2271) (0.2271)  (1.5104) (1.5104) 
τ 55.72*** 55.72*** 54.12*** 54.12***  0.80 0.80 
Log likelihood -7388.69 -7388.69 -4593.86 -4593.86  -2716.43 -2716.43 
% correctly predicted 83 83 79 79  76 76 
Observations 7108 7108 4488 4488   2620  2620 
Base category: No-care; Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Calculations based on GLSS 5 
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Table 6 
 Price and income elasticities of health care demand, by expenditure quintiles 
 Own price elasticitya Cross price elasticityb 
Quintilec Entire sample Adults Children Entire sample Adults Children
Public       
1 -0.1924 -0.3045 -0.0896 0.3009 0.4249 0.0161 
2 -0.0718 -0.1023 -0.0525 0.1150 0.1528 0.0082 
3 -0.0829 -0.0965 -0.0421 0.0901 0.1398 0.0069 
4 -0.0502 -0.0853 -0.0329 0.0724 0.1143 0.0057 
5 -0.0325 -0.0475 -0.0219 0.0434 0.0595 0.0040 
All -0.0899 -0.1192 -0.0477 0.1311 0.1427 0.0082 
Private       
1 -0.0795 -0.0833 -0.0334 0.0333 0.0032 0.0066 
2 -0.0422 -0.0611 -0.0195 0.0248 0.0387 0.0036 
3 -0.0220 -0.0588 -0.0120 0.0149 0.0344 0.0023 
4 -0.0250 -0.0423 -0.0118 0.0175 0.0320 0.0025 
5 -0.0171 -0.0224 -0.0057 0.0118 0.0172 0.0011 
All -0.0389 -0.0523 -0.0164 0.0210 0.0248 0.0032 
Notes: 
Source: Estimated from the nested logit estimates reported in Table 5.8 
aelasticity of public (private) school with respect to public (private) school price change 
belasticity of public (private) school with respect to private (public) school price change 
chousehold expenditure per equivalent adults 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Simulated probabilities by expenditure quintiles, and type of provider 
 Quintile         All 
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  Poorest 20% 2 3 4 Richest 20%   
Baseline       
No-care 0.4687 0.4248 0.4041 0.3766 0.3434 0.4062 
Private 0.2983 0.3237 0.3330 0.3464 0.3498 0.3290 
Public 0.2329 0.2515 0.2628 0.2769 0.3068 0.2648 
Price of public option is zero     
No-care 0.3935 0.3522 0.3325 0.3070 0.2741 0.3344 
Private 0.2642 0.2833 0.2889 0.2973 0.2949 0.2849 
Public 0.3423 0.3645 0.3786 0.3957 0.4310 0.3808 
Doubling price of public option     
No-care 0.6157 0.5756 0.5540 0.5261 0.4908 0.5550 
Private 0.3304 0.3523 0.3540 0.3711 0.3709 0.3558 
Public 0.0539 0.0720 0.0920 0.1028 0.1383 0.0892 
Doubling price and reducing travel cost of public option by half 
No-care 0.4366 0.3962 0.3831 0.3519 0.3223 0.3780 
Private 0.2947 0.3198 0.3246 0.3350 0.3507 0.3249 
Public 0.2687 0.2840 0.2923 0.3131 0.3270 0.2970 
Moving everybody out of the poorest quintile (GH¢9,568,124) 
No-care 0.4468 0.4248 0.4041 0.3766 0.3434 0.4012 
Private 0.3109 0.3237 0.3330 0.3464 0.3498 0.3319 
Public 0.2423 0.2515 0.2628 0.2769 0.3068 0.2670 
Bringing all poor households to the upper poverty line(GH¢3,708,900)  
No-care 0.4667 0.4248 0.4041 0.3766 0.3434 0.4057 
Private 0.2995 0.3237 0.3330 0.3464 0.3498 0.3293 
Public 0.2338 0.2515 0.2628 0.2769 0.3068 0.2650 
Source: Own estimation based on GLSS5 data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A.1 
OLS Wage model, Ghana 
Variables  Coefficient t‐value 
Constant  11.2327 115.78 
Age  0.0198 8.22 
Age square  ‐0.0005 ‐10.09 
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Married  0.2003 7.02 
Region/area of residence    
    Accra (GAMA)  0.9523 19.85 
    Other urban  0.6569 17.39 
    Rural coastal  0.3150 6.83 
    Rural forest  0.3058 7.93 
Relationship to head     
    Spouse of head  ‐0.3678 ‐12.31 
    Relatives  ‐0.4313 ‐6.08 
    Nonrelatives  ‐0.5935 ‐2.61 
Household composition    
    No. of relatives in household  ‐0.0021 ‐0.20 
    No. of non‐ relatives in household   0.1414 2.88 
    Number of men in household  0.0966 7.37 
    Number  of women in household   ‐0.0079 ‐0.59 
    Number of children in household  0.0161 2.28 
Years of education     
    Primary graduate e  0.2837 9.86 
    Secondary graduate   0.6664 15.23 
    University/Polytechnic graduate  1.2764 13.72 
     Postgraduate  2.2534 11.62 
Father's education     
     Primary graduate  ‐0.0797 ‐1.24 
     Middle/Junior high graduate  0.0122 0.37 
     Secondary graduate  0.0983 1.32 
     Postsecondary graduate   0.2383 3.52 
Mother's education     
     Primary graduate  0.0065 0.10 
     Middle/Junior high graduate  ‐0.0616 ‐1.60 
     Secondary graduate  ‐0.0352 ‐0.36 
     Postsecondary graduate  0.0899 0.67 
Head's sector of employment     
     Formal  0.3082 5.03 
     Informal  0.0456 0.86 
Source: Own estimations based on GLSS 5 data. Note: N=9,796 observations. R2 = 0.235.  
Model estimated on all respondents older than 9 years who reported to have worked and received 
wages. The dependent variable is log wage. 
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Appendix A.2 
Definition of variables 
NETEXPEND (in million C) Household expenditure minus schooling cost 
Female Dummy variable (= 1 if individual is female, 0 if male) 
Child of head Dummy variable (= 1 if child of head, 0 otherwise) 
Other Child Dummy variable (= 1 if not child of, 0 other household member) 
Married Dummy variable (= 1 if married , 0 if not married) 
Spouse head Dummy variable (= 1 if spouse of household head) 
Female headed Dummy variable (= 1 household head is female, 0 if male) 
No of days ill Number of days the individual has been ill  
Primary  Dummy variable (=1 if one has a private health insurance contract) 
Secondary  Dummy variable (= 1 if individual is Catholic, 0 otherwise) 
Postsecondary Dummy variable (= 1 if individual is Pentecostal, 0 otherwise) 
Insurance Dummy variable (=1 if individual has a private health insurance) 
Catholic Dummy variable (= 1 if individual is a Catholic, 0 otherwise) 
Pentecostal Dummy variable (= 1 if individual is a Pentecostal, 0 otherwise) 
Moslem Dummy variable (= 1 if individual is a Moslem, 0 otherwise) 
Traditional Dummy variable (= 1 if religion is Traditional 0 otherwise) 
Accra (GAMA) Dummy variable (= 1 if ind. resides in Accra metropolis, 0 otherwise) 
Other urban Dummy variable (= 1 if ind. resides in other urban areas, 0 otherwise) 
Rural coastal Dummy variable (= 1 if ind. resides in rural coastal area, 0 otherwise) 
Rural forest Dummy variable (= 1 if ind. resides in rural forest area, 0 otherwise) 
Rural Savannah Dummy variable (= 1 if ind. resides in rural savannah area, 0 otherwise)
Head formal sector Dummy variable (= 1 if head works in a formal area, 0 otherwise) 
Head informal sector Dummy variable (= 1 if head works in a informal area, 0 otherwise) 
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Figure 1 
 Concentration Curves for Public Health Services, 2005/06 
 
      (a) Hospital services, 2005/06        (b) Clinic services, 2005/06 
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(c) Pre-natal services    (d) Post-natal services 
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Source: Own estimations based on GLSS 5 survey 
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Figure 1 (continued) 
 
     (e) Immunization services, 2005/06      (f) All Public Health Services, 2005/06 
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Source: Own estimation based on GLSS 5 data 
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Figure 2: Concentration Curves using the Compensating Variation, 2005/06 
 
(a) Children Health, 2005/06  (b) Adults Health, 2005/06 
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Source: Own estimation based on GLSS 5 data 
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